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EVIDENCE
I. TESTIMONY REGARDING BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME
ADMISSIBLE
In State v. Hill1 the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed a trial court decision which excluded proffered expert tes-
timony on the battered woman's syndrome.' The court held in
this case of first impression that such testimony was admissible
to help establish a claim of self-defense in a homicide case.3
Sherry Hill was charged with murder in the shooting death
of her boyfriend, Ricky Goodman, and she was later convicted of
voluntary manslaughter. Hill admitted shooting Goodman, but
claimed self-defense.4 Testimony in the trial centered around
Goodman's verbal and physical abuse of Hill. Hill testified that
on the morning of the shooting, the deceased beat her, pointed a
pistol at her, and said he would either "beat the hell out of [her]
or ...kill [her]." 5 Hill testified that when she shot Goodman
she believed she was in imminent danger.'
The State attempted to discredit Hill's testimony by argu-
ing that if Hill truly feared Goodman she would have left him.'
A central issue at trial, therefore, was the reasonableness of
Hill's belief that her life was in imminent danger.' To support
her claim of self-defense, Hill proffered expert testimony on the
1. 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986).
2. The battered woman's syndrome is a psychosocial theory that describes identi-
fiable characteristics common to women who have experienced physical and emotional
abuse over an extended period of time in an intimate relationship. Battered women tend
to have an extraordinary emotional dependence on men and suffer from low self-esteem.
Verbal abuse usually accompanies the beatings and contributes to their belief that they
must be doing something wrong to cause their mate to beat them. These continuous
beatings create a "learned" helplessness, evidenced by a reduction in motivation to avoid
the beatings and an altered perception of the woman's ability to succeed at even simple
tasks. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
3. 287 S.C. at 399, 339 S.E.2d at 122.
4. Id.
5. Record at 227.
6. 287 S.C. at 399, 339 S.E.2d at 121.
7. Id., 339 S.E.2d at 122.
8. Brief of Appellant at 7.
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battered woman's syndrome. She claimed that the testimony
was relevant to explain why a battered woman would remain
with her mate although she reasonably feared serious harm from
him.9 The trial judge excluded the testimony on the grounds
that it was irrelevant and cumulative.
10
In South Carolina the admissibility of evidence is deter-
mined by a test similar to that used under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.1" To be admissible under the South Carolina stan-
dard, the evidence must "make more or less probable, some mat-
ter in issue, and bear directly or indirectly thereon."' 2 In holding
that the battered woman's syndrome meets these criteria and is
thus a proper subject for expert testimony, 3 the court relied on
cases from other jurisdictions.' Adopting the majority view, the
supreme court concluded that the expert testimony would have
served two relevant functions.' 5 First, the testimony would have
supported Hill's belief that she was in imminent danger when
she shot Goodman 16 and would have reinforced her contention
9. 287 S.C. at 399, 339 S.E.2d at 122.
10. Id.
11. See IV. REISER, A COMPALisON OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SOUTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE LAW (1976).
12. Ellison v. Simmons, 238 S.C. 364, 368, 120 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1961).
13. 287 S.C. at 399, 339 S.E.2d at 122.
14. See, e.g., Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (expert opin-
ion evidence about battered woman's syndrome is admissible to extent it relates to a
defendant's claim of self-defense); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683
(1981) ("Expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate
issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not
ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the
average layman."); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (in a murder prosecu-
tion which resulted in conviction of reckless manslaughter, expert testimony on battered
woman's syndrome was relevant to reasonableness of defendant's belief that she was in
imminent danger of death or serious injury and would have permitted conclusion, con-
trary to general misconceptions regarding battered women, that defendant's failure to
leave victim reinforced her credibility as to severity and frequency of prior beatings);
People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (1985) ("[Plroffered ex-
pert evidence [on battered woman's syndrome] is admissible [in second-degree murder
prosecution] as having a substantial bearing on the defendant's state of mind at the time
of the shooting and is, therefore, relevant to the jury's evaluation of the reasonableness
of her perceptions and behavior at that time.").
15. Some courts have excluded battered woman's syndrome testimony as irrelevant
to the woman's self-defense claim. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521,
423 N.E2d 137, 140 (1981).
16. Some courts have allowed the jury to consider the defendant's gender in assess-
ing the reasonableness of her actions. In State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548
(1977), a landmark decision on sex bias in the law of self-defense, the Washington Su-
2
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that she acted in self-defense." Second, the expert would have
supplied an interpretation of the facts relating to the defend-
ant's state of mind at the time of the shooting.18
Although expert testimony concerning this syndrome is rele-
vant when self-defense is asserted, some jurisdictions have found
other problems with its admissibility.19 First, admitting syn-
drome testimony allows the expert to state his opinion on an
preme Court reversed the conviction of a woman for the murder of a male attacker. The
court held that a woman's constitutional right to equal protection is violated when jury
instructions on self-defense couched in all male pronouns suggest that her conduct must
be measured against the reasonable male in the same circumstances. Id. at 239-41, 559
P.2d at 559; see also Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend
Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, in WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE
CASES (E. Bochnak ed. 1981).
17. Under South Carolina law, to prove self-defense in a homicide case, the defend-
ant must establish the following:
(1) That he was without fault in bringing on the difficulty.
(2) That he actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life
or of sustaining serious bodily injury,. . . or he actually was in imminent dan-
ger of losing his life or of sustaining serious bodily injury.
(3) If his defense is based on his actual belief of imminent danger, that a
reasonable prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have enter-
tained the same belief,. . . or if his defense is based on his being in actual and
imminent danger, that "the circumstances were such as would warrant a man
of ordinary prudence, firmness, and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to
save himself from serious bodily harm, or losing his own life."
(4) That he had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing
his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as he did in the
particular instance.
State v. Hendrix, 270 S.C. 653, 657-58, 244 S.E.2d 503 505-06 (1978) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
18. The key to self-defense lies in the definition of what perceptions are reasonable
for a victim of violence. According to Dr. Lenore Walker, a prominent writer on the
battered woman's syndrome, relationships characterized by physical abuse tend to de-
velop battering cycles. Violent behavior directed at the woman occurs in three distinct
and negative stages: the tension-building phase, the acute battering incident, and the
extreme loving behavior phase. The cyclical nature of battering behavior helps explain
why more women simply do not leave their abusers. The loving behavior demonstrated
by the batterer during phase three reinforces whatever hopes these women might have
for their mate's reform and keeps them bound to the relationship. See L. WALKER, supra
note 2, at 55-70. Testimony as to the cycle theory of violence common to battered women
indicates a predictable pattern of abuse and demonstrates the reasonableness of a wo-
man's perception that she is in imminent danger.
19. For decisions holding expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome irrele-
vant in claims of self-defense, see People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196
(1980). In Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981), the court held that the expert
testimony on battered woman's syndrome was irrelevant in view of the particular facts of
the case. See also State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Thomas,
66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
3
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ultimate issue of fact and, therefore, to invade the province of
the jury.20 For South Carolina and other jurisdictions adopting
the Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to expert opinion,21
"[tiestimony in the form of opinion or inference otherwise ad-
missible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate is-
sue to be decided by the trier of fact. ' 22 Second, syndrome testi-
mony relates to a subject within the experience of the average
layman: 23 arguably, fear and belief of imminent danger are ele-
ments within the average juror's experience and do not require
expert explanation.24 The majority of the courts that have ruled
on the admissibility of battered woman's syndrome testimony,
however, have followed the decision of Ibn-Tamas v. United
States.25 That decision held that to understand the defendant's
state of mind, the jury must understand the battered woman's
special beliefs that are not within the experience of the average
layman.20 Last, some courts question the reliability of the bat-
tered woman syndrome theory.2 7 Although reliability problems
might indicate that syndrome testimony should be excluded,
South Carolina courts hold that the trial court, in its discretion,
should determine whether the witness qualifies as an expert.28
Hill, therefore, recognized the relevancy of battered wo-
man's syndrome testimony as a matter of law, but limited its use
to situations in which the expert has been qualified properly.2 9
The testifying witness must still meet the traditional test for ex-
20. See 627 P.2d at 1378.
21. South Carolina appears to have adopted the Federal Rule with respect to ex-
pert opinion. IV. REISER, supra note 11, at 35.
22. FED. R. EVID. 704.
23. Expert testimony is appropriate when the subject of the inquiry is outside the
normal experience and understanding of the jury; however, "on matters for which all
materials for judgment are already before the jury, and no specific skill or experience is
necessary in order to reach a conclusion, . . . opinion evidence is properly excluded."
Huggins v. Broom, 189 S.C. 15, 18, 199 S.E. 903, 904 (1938).
24. See State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981).
25. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
26. Id. at 634-35; see also Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683
(1981).
27. Dr. Lenore Walker has admitted that many of her research Conclusions are ten-
tative and that further research may be necessary to confirm her contentions. L.
WALKER, supra note 2, at xv-xvi.
28. 287 S.C. at 400, 339 S.E.2d at 122.
29. See Note, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W.L.
REV. 485, 507-10 (1984); Note, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife
Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 348, 365-67 (1982).
4
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pert qualifications, 30 leaving trial courts free to limit who may
testify about battered woman's syndrome.
In the wake of Hill, practitioners should be aware of the
possible uses and limits of testimony concerning the battered
woman's syndrome. Significantly, the court is "not recognizing
the battered woman's syndrome as a separate defense."'" Testi-
mony relating to the syndrome, therefore, while not endorsing
the use of deadly force as a justifiable retaliation against bat-
tering, may be offered to educate juries about the peculiar
mental and emotional state of a battered woman. 2 The expert's
role as educator would serve to dispel a jury's misconceptions
about battered women, but would not establish the battered wo-
man's syndrome as a defense to murder. Further, Hill marks the
first step toward judicial recognition of the syndrome by con-
cluding as a matter of law that the theory is relevant to show a
fear of imminent danger and state of mind. Since the admission
of the testimony into evidence is within the trial judge's discre-
tion, however, the guidance which Hill provides to future liti-
gants on the ultimate question of admissibility is limited.
33
Sally A. Hildebrand
II. PHOTOGRAPH OF NUDE HOMICIDE VICTIM NOT UNDULY
PREJUDICIAL
In State v. Todd3 4 the supreme court, in accordance with
South Carolina case law3 5 and the general rule throughout the
country, 6 allowed a photograph of a homicide victim into evi-
30. To qualify as an expert, a "witness must have acquired by reason of study or
experience or both such knowledge and skill in business, profession, or science that he is
better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on particular subject of testimony."
Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 585-86, 320 S.E.2d 59, 64 (Ct. App. 1984).
31. 287 S.C. at 400, 339 S.E.2d at 122.
32. See Note, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed Approach to the Use of Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 VAND. L. REv. 741 (1982).
33. For example, in a decision dated just two months after Smith, the Georgia Su-
preme Court held that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome was inadmis-
sible because the testimony related to the defendant's reasonable fears, which could be
comprehended by average jurors. Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 282 S.E.2d 334 (1981).
34. 290 S.C. 213, 349 S.E.2d 339 (1986).
35. State v. Livingston, 282 S.C. 1, 317 S.E.2d 129 (1984); State v. Edwards, 194
S.C. 410, 10 S.E.2d 587 (1940).
36. Annotation, Admissibility of Photograph of Corpse in Prosecution for Homi-
19871
5
Duggan: Evidence
Published by Scholar Commons, 1987
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REViEW
dence. The court affirmed a lower court ruling and stated that
the photograph, which depicted a gunshot wound beneath the
exposed left breast of the female decedent, should be admitted if
its use was not "calculated to arouse the sympathy or prejudice
of the jury [and was not] irrelevant or unnecessary to substanti-
ate facts. '3 7 The chief issue on appeal was whether the photo-
graph was unduly prejudicial because, in the same proceeding,
the defendant also faced charges of assault with intent to com-
mit criminal sexual conduct.3
Todd argued that no material issue of fact concerning the
cause of death remained because testimony regarding the au-
topsy report was entered without objection and Todd admitted
that the gunshot entered the victim's chest."9 The photograph,
therefore, had no probative value, while the "obvious sexual
overtones"40 of the photograph exacerbated the danger of undue
prejudice. The inappropriate and likely result of admitting the
evidence, according to Todd, was that the photograph's impact
overshadowed testimony that medical personnel, not Todd, re-
moved the victim's brassiere.4'
The supreme court held that the trial court validly exer-
cised its discretion in admitting the photograph. The court
found that the evidence was corroborative of the pathologist's
testimony that the bullet entered the victim's chest near the
heart and followed a downward path, lodging in the victim's
lower back.42 Todd, however, offered inconsistent testimony
which depicted the victim as standing above or sitting directly
across from Todd when the shooting occurred. 43 Although it is
cide or Civil Action for Causing Death, 73 A.L.R.2D 769 (1960).
37. 290 S.C. at 215, 349 S.E.2d at 340.
38. Record at 1. Before the photograph was taken, emergency medical personnel,
not the defendant, removed the victim's blouse and brassiere to administer aid. Record
at 11.
39. Brief of Appellant at 4-5. Todd's argument is similar to the argument advanced
in State v. Waitus, 224 S.C. 12, 77 S.E.2d 256 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955).
In Waitus, relevant facts were established fully by uncontradicted medical and lay testi-
mony. Because there was no dispute about these facts, the court found that the photo-
graphs of the victim "were calculated to inflame and arouse the passions of the jury and
their introduction was wholly unnecessary." 224 S.C. at 27, 77 S.E.2d at 263; see also
State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986).
40. Brief of Appellant at 6.
41. Id.
42. 290 S.C. at 215, 349 S.E.2d at 340; Record at 13-14.
43. Record at 55-58.
[Vol. 39
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not clear in this case that photographs of the gunshot wound
showed the trajectory of the bullet," the supreme court tradi-
tionally has affirmed the admission of photographs that tend to
corroborate medical testimony on record.45
Also significant in the decision to allow the photograph into
evidence was "explicit testimony" 46 that medical personnel re-
moved the victim's blouse at the scene of the shooting. Gener-
ally, a court may admit photographs that show conditions differ-
ent from those described by eyewitnesses if the differences are
sufficiently explained to the jury to avoid distortion or confu-
sion.47 In adopting this general rule, the supreme court also
found that the testimony regarding removal of the blouse re-
duced the chances of undue prejudice.48
Todd indicates that photographs of a homicide victim which
are not gruesome will be difficult to exclude from evidence, espe-
cially when medical testimony concerning cause of death is in
the record. Although admitting photos of a nude victim into evi-
dence often will be prejudicial to a defendant who is also facing
sexual misconduct charges, the showing of that prejudice must
be quite strong for exclusion of the evidence. In the view of the
supreme court, such evidence retains sufficient probative value
to be admissible.
James D. Myrick
44. The State argued:
Inasmuch as Appellant argued that the killing was accidental, all circum-
stances surrounding the shooting were relevant to ascertain the truth. This is
particularly true of the location and appearance of the bullet wound because of
the inconsistencies between the Appellant's testimony and the physical evi-
dence offered by the State as to the downward movement of the bullet through
the victim's body.
Brief of Respondent at 4.
45. In State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037
(1980), contradictory testimony arose concerning whether death was by asphyxiation or
strangulation. The supreme court held that photographs of band-like bruises on the face
and neck of the victim were admissible as corroborative of medical testimony indicating
strangulation. Similarly, in an earlier case, the court held that the photographs of a vic-
tim's body were admissible to confirm the examining physician's conclusion that strangu-
lation was the cause of death. State v. Bellue, 260 S.C. 39, 194 S.E.2d 193 (1973).
46. 290 S.C. at 215, 349 S.E.2d at 340.
47. See Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 552, 323 S.E.2d 577, 588
(1984), cert. denied sub nom. Washington v. Virginia, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985).
48. 290 S.C. at 215, 349 S.E.2d at 340.
1987]
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III. SCOPE OF DEAD MAN'S STATUTE ENLARGED
In In re Estate of Mason v. Mason9 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that self-serving testimony, whether
designed to affirm or to negate a fact concerning the destruction
of a will, falls within the purview of the South Carolina Dead
Man's Statute.5 0 By excluding this testimony, the court enlarged
the scope of the Dead Man's Statute.
This litigation arose when Ruth Carlton petitioned the
court to prove the will of Roma Mason5' by the exemplification
of a photocopy of the will. The original will was destroyed before
Mason's death. The trial judge allowed Ruby Ingle, Mason's
daughter, to testify that she destroyed the will of the decedent
in his absence and without his consent. After hearing Ingle's tes-
timony the trial court found that the decedent died testate. The
trial court held that the missing original will executed by the
49. 289 S.C. 273, 346 S.E.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1986).
50. Id. at 280, 346 S.E.2d at 33. "It was the general rule at common law that a
person interested in the outcome of an action could not be relied on to testify accurately
and was therefore incompetent as a witness." Long v. Conroy, 246 S.C. 225, 231, 143
S.E.2d 459, 462 (1965). The common-law rule has been changed in most respects by stat-
ute. Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985), a party to an action may
testify irk the same manner anc subject to the same rules of examination as any other
witness. Section 19-11-10, however, is subject to the exceptions set forth in § 19-11-20,
known as the Dead Man's Statute. The Dead Man's Statute provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 19-11-10, no party to an action or proceed-
ing, no person who has a legal or equitable interest which may be affected by
the event of the action or proceeding, no person who, previous to such exami-
nation, has had such an interest, however the same may have been transferred
or come to the party to the action or proceeding, and no assignor of anything
in controversy in the action shall be examined in regard to any transaction or
communication between such witness and a person at the time of such exami-
nation deceased, insane or lunatic as a witness against a party then prosecuting
or defending the action as executor, administrator, heir-at-law, next of kin, as-
signee, legatee, devisee or survivor of such deceased person or as assignee or
committee of such insane person or lunatic, when such examination or any
judgment or determination in such action or proceeding can in any manner
affect the interest of such witness or the interest previously owned or repre-
sented by him.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
51. The statutory heirs at law of Roma Mason were his daughters, Ruth Carlton,
Ruby Ingle, Alma Spooner, and Frances Crymes; and his sons, Charles Calvin Mason and
Clyde Mason. Ruby Ingle stood to receive much more under the will than under the
Statutes of Descent and Distribution, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-3-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1986) (repealed 1987). 289 S.C. at 275, 346 S.E.2d at 30.
8
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decedent was not destroyed animo revocandi"2 and that the copy
should be submitted to probate.53 Appellant Alma Spooner
claimed that Ingle's testimony violated the Dead Man's Statute
and, therefore, should not have been admitted into evidence.
The South Carolina Dead Man's Statute prohibits an inter-
ested witness from testifying against the estate of the deceased
or insane person when the testimony is "in regard to any trans-
action or communication" '54 between the witness and the de-
ceased or the insane person, and the witness has or had a per-
sonal interest in the outcome.5 The crux of the case was the
interpretation of the word "transaction." The court recognized
that under a strict reading of the statute, Ingle's testimony that
she destroyed the will was neither a transaction nor a communi-
cation.5 6 The court reasoned, however, that the admission of the
testimony would circumvent the purpose of the statute by al-
lowing the witness "to testify as to matters, of which, if such
testimony is untrue, it cannot be contradicted by the
deceased. 57
In refusing to admit Ingle's testimony, the court also relied
on the broad interpretation of "transaction" used in the Georgia
52. When a will that cannot be found following the death of the testator is shown
to have been in his possession when it was last seen, the presumption is that he de-
stroyed it animo revocandi (with intention to revoke). Davis v. Davis, 214 S.C. 247, 255,
52 S.E.2d 192, 195 (1949); 79 Am. JUR. 2D Wills § 606 (1964). A party may rebut this
presumption by presenting evidence that the will existed at the time of the testator's
death, was lost subsequent to his death, or was destroyed by another without the testa-
tor's authority. Lowe v. Fickling, 207 S.C. 442, 447, 36 S.E.2d 293, 295 (1945).
53. Reply Brief of Appellant at 3.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
55. The South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the statute in Long v. Conroy,
246 S.C. 225, 143 S.E.2d 459 (1969) and Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S.C. 488, 25 S.E. 797
(1896). Under the Dead Man's Statute, four groups of people are incompetent to testify:
(1) parties to an action or proceeding; (2) parties with an interest which may be affected
by trial; (3) parties who once had an interest which may be affected by trial; and (4) an
assignee of a thing in controversy in the action. 246 S.C. at 232, 143 S.E.2d at 462. Not
only must a party fall into one of these four groups to be deemed incompetent, but that
party must also meet each of the following three further tests: (a) One's testimony must
be about a transaction or occurrence between himself and the deceased or insane person;
(b) the testimony must be offered against the personal representative or the survivor of
the deceased person or the assignee or committee of an insane person; and (c) the pre-
sent or previous interest of the witness must be affected by the testimony. Id. at 232, 143
S.E.2d at 462; 47 S.C. at 492, 25 S.E. at 799.
56. 289 S.C. at 279, 346 S.E.2d at 32.
57. Id. (citing Trimmier v. Thomson, 41 S.C. 125, 19 S.E. 291 (1894)).
9
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case Daniel v. O'Kelley.55 In Daniel the Georgia Supreme Court
held that a claim by a witness that a decedent did not enter into
a contract is similar under the Dead Man's Statute to testimony
that the decedent did enter into a contract. 9 By analogy the
South Carolina Court of Appeals held that testimony that a tes-
tator did not perform a certain act is equivalent to testimony
that he did perform the act.6 0
While the South Carolina courts generally have given a nar-
row construction to the Dead Man's Statute as a whole,6' Mason
indicates that the word "transaction" may be given a more lib-
eral interpretation in some cases to effectuate the purpose of the
statute.6 2 Although the word "mutual" does not appear in the
statute, South Carolina cases have held that "the word 'transac-
tion', as used in the statute, implies mutuality; something done
in concert, in which both take some part.6s3 The South Carolina
courts, therefore, have limited a "transaction" to an act in which
the deceased participated. A "transaction" has not included tes-
timony concerning a matter known to the witness by means
other than dealings with the decedent .4 Mason indicates, how-
ever, that an interested party cannot prove the existence of an
express agreement, or deny the agreement, on the strength of his
58. 227 Ga. 282, 180 S.E.2d 707 (1971).
59. Id. at 286, 180 S.E.2d at 709-10.
60. 289 S.C. at 280, 346 S.E.2d at 33. The variants of the Dead Man's Statute are
so numerous that no statute seems entirely typical, and a great deal of conflicting and
confusing case law exists as to their interpretation. In a majority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, a party or interested person is incompetent to deny that a particular transaction
occurred. See Annotation, Dead Man Statute as Applicable to Testimony Denying
Transaction or Communication Between Witness and Person Since Deceased, 8
A.L.R.2D 1094 (1949).
61. Hicks v. Battey, 259 S.C. 426, 192 S.E.2d 477 (1972); Lisenby v. Newsom, 234
S.C. 237, 107 S.E.2d 449 (1959).
62. The Dean Man's Statute was enacted to protect the estates of deceased persons
from uncontradicted interested testimony. Trimmier v. Thomson, 41 S.C. 125, 130, 19
S.E. 291, 294 (1894).
63. Starnes v. Miller, 275 S.C. 16, 18, 266 S.E.2d 790, 791 (1980); 259 S.C. 426, 192
S.E.2d 477 (in personal injury action, plaintiff permitted to relate his observations of
how accident happened, including the independent, involuntary acts of the deceased);
Sullivan v. Latimer, 38 S.C. 158, 17 S.E. 701 (1893) (in suit by doctor for services ren-
dered to deceased, doctor allowed to testify as to the physical condition of the deceased).
64. The court applied this definition of "transaction" in Starnes where the court
permitted the sole survivor of a one-car accident to testify as to the identity of the de-
ceased driver and the speed of the vehicle at the time of the accident. The court rea-
soned that the testimony "concerned the independent act of appellant's intestate in op-
erating the vehicle; he simply related what he saw." 275 S.C. at 19, 266 S.E.2d at 791.
10
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uncorroborated testimony, because this is "testimony amounting
to a denial of the material issue of the case.
'65
This decision is harsh for those wishing to testify against
the estate of a decedent. According to the court, the purpose of
the statute is "to prevent an undue advantage on the part of the
living over the dead." 6 The assumption that a deceased person
would be unable to protect his own interests against a living ad-
versary is faulty, however, because the representatives of a dece-
dent generally will have a sufficiently strong stake in the case to
defend the decedent's interests.6
The Federal Rules of Evidence effectively abolish the Dead
Man's Statute" except in diversity cases, and several states have
created a hearsay exception for statements by the deceased as to
matters in dispute.6 9 A court in a state recognizing the hearsay
exception thus has the benefit of all the available evidence on
the matter and can make a decision according to the relative
weight it chooses to give the evidence.70 In South Carolina, how-
ever, the Dead Man's Statute is deeply ingrained and probably
will not be repealed by the legislature.
By holding that testimony either confirming or denying a
fact is prohibited by the Dead Man's Statute, the court of ap-
peals in Mason enlarged the scope of the statute. While the rule
may have been intended to protect the estate of decedents
against fraud, the exclusion operates indiscriminately to bar tes-
timony which is favorable, as well as that which is unfavorable. 1
Both parties would better be protected by creating a hearsay ex-
ception which would allow the survivor to testify without
restriction.
Sally A. Hildebrand
65. 289 S.C. at 280, 346 S.E.2d at 32.
66. Id. at 279, 346 S.E.2d at 32 (quoting Owens v. Owens, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878).
67. Accord Note, The Dead Man's Rule in Alabama, 23 ALA. L. REV. 405, 419-20
(1971).
68. "Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules." FED. R. EVID. 601.
69. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-172 (1958); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:25 (1974);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-34 (1979).
70. For further discussion of the hearsay exception alternative, see Chadbourn,
History and Interpretation of the California Dead Man's Statute: A Proposal for Liber-
alization, 4 UCLA L. REV. 175 (1957).
71. See C. McCoRMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 65 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
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IV. NONMEDICAL PSYCHOLOGIST QUALIFIED AS EXPERT ON
MENTAL DISTURBANCE
In Howle v. PYA/Monarch, Inc.7 2 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals addressed whether nonmedical psychologists are
competent to testify on the diagnosis, prognosis, and causation
of mental and emotional disturbances. In concluding that these
witnesses are competent, the court settled a question of first im-
pression in South Carolina and adopted the more liberal major-
ity approach that delineates the allowable extent of a psycholo-
gist's expert testimony.
Howle was injured in an automobile collision with an em-
ployee of PYA/Monarch (PYA). Howle brought a tort action
against the employee and PYA. The trial judge allowed Howle to
present testimony of a nonmedical psychologist, Jan Bixler, who
qualified as an expert because of his extensive education, train-
ing, and experience.73 Bixler testified that Howle was suffering
from acute anxiety neurosis with depression caused by the acci-
dent and that the residual effects of the accident would remain
with her indefinitely.
7 4
On appeal PYA argued that because Bixler was not a medi-
cal doctor he was not qualified to give expert opinion testimony
concerning his diagnosis, prognosis, and determination of causa-
tion of Howle's mental condition.75 Rejecting this argument, the
court noted that the qualification of a witness as an expert is
within the discretion of the trial judge.7 The court of appeals
72. 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1986).
73. Record at 83-87.
74. Record at 95-97.
75. "Qualified" and "competent" are adjectives often mistakenly used interchange-
ably, but the subtle differences and similarities in the meanings of the words is signifi-
cant. Generally, an expert witness is "qualified" if he has the requisite skill and knowl-
edge concerning the subject of testimony. In a strict sense, however, a witness is
"competent" to testify if he is not proscribed by law from so doing. Because PYA ulti-
mately argued that statutory law prevented Bixler from testifying, PYA was, in the strict
sense of the word, making a "competency" argument. Unfortunately, the clarity of this
opinion is skewed since PYA never used the word "competent" in its argument. The
court of appeals, however, used it freely in its opinion and finally predicated its holding
on the word "competent."
76. 288 S.C. at 592, 344 S.E.2d at 160 (citing Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 328
S.E.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1985)).
100 [Vol. 39
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reasoned that neither section 40-47-4077 nor section 40-55-507" of
the South Carolina Code bars a nonmedical psychologist from
testifying about diagnosis, prognosis, or causation. 9 The court
concluded that since section 40-55-60 contemplates a psycholo-
gist diagnosing, prescribing, treating, or advising clients within
the limits of his practice, 80 the statute implies that he may tes-
tify to those activities.8 1 Virtually every state has addressed this
issue, and the jurisdictions are split roughly between three posi-
tions. The majority rule-which South Carolina has now
adopted-allows psychologists to testify as to diagnosis, progno-
sis, or causation.2 Second, some jurisdictions permit only psy-
chiatrists to give this type of expert testimony.83 Last, some ju-
risdictions bar psychologists from giving expert testimony
concerning causation, but allow them to testify concerning diag-
nosis and prognosis.8 4
The few jurisdictions that allow only psychiatrists to give
expert testimony on mental illness generally rely on the reason-
ing that mental illness is a medical matter in which only medical
doctors have sufficient training to qualify as experts. Of these
jurisdictions, some base their reasoning on statutes that pre-
clude psychologists from engaging, in any manner, in the prac-
tice of medicine.88 The overwhelming trend, however, is to follow
the approach contemplated by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence "that it is the qualifications of the witness that count
rather than his title.
' '87
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-40 (Law. Co-op. 1986) defines the "practice of
medicine."
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-55-50 (Law. Co-op. 1986) enumerates the acts that consti-
tute practice as a psychologist.
79. 288 S.C. at 594, 344 S.E.2d at 161.
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-55-60 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
81. 288 S.C. at 594, 344 S.E.2d at 161.
82. Id.; see Kravinsky v. Glover, 263 Pa. Super. 8, 396 A.2d 1349 (1979); Landreth
v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
83. See Bilbrey v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Ariz. App. 473, 556 P.2d 27 (1976);
Campbell v. Pommier, 5 Conn. App. 29, 496 A.2d 975 (1985); Spann v. Bees, 23 Md. App.
313, 327 A.2d 801 (1974).
84. See Kriewitz v. Savoy Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 396 So. 2d 49 (Ala.
1981); see also Reese v. Naylor, 222 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
85. See cases cited supra note 83.
86. See 27 Ariz. App. 473, 556 P.2d 27.
87. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 702[04], at 702-25 (1985);
FED. R. Evm. 702.
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The significance of Howle is twofold. First, the court of ap-
peals indicated a willingness to allow psychologists to testify
about areas in which only psychiatrists were once considered ca-
pable."" Second, and more importantly, this case demonstrates
the proper analysis for determining whether a witness is quali-
fied to give expert testimony in South Carolina. Howle quells
again8 the old argument that a witness must have a certain edu-
cational title or license in order to qualify as an expert witness.
Under the Howle analysis, the court will first determine if the
witness has acquired, through study or experience or both, the
particular knowledge and skill which would make him better
qualified than the jury to form a particular opinion. 0 The trial
judge then has the discretion whether to qualify the witness as
an expert.9 1 Practitioners should note, therefore, that the lack of
a title, a formal education, or a license in an area no longer auto-
matically excludes a nonmedical psychologist from offering ex-
pert testimony.
J. James Duggan
V. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR GUILTY PLEA TO ACCOMMODATION SALE
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ADMISSIBLE FOR IMPEACHMENT
In Porter v. State92 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held that admitting for impeachment purposes evidence of a
prior guilty plea to an accommodation sale of a controlled sub-
stance was proper. Porter, the defendant, contended that the
trial judge erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach his testi-
mony by introducing Porter's previous plea of guilty to the sale
of a controlled substance. The supreme court, however, affirmed
the lower court's denial of post-conviction relief.9 3 Porter was
sentenced in 1981 for an "accommodation sale" conviction under
88. The probative value of psychological testimony is often criticized. See gener-
ally Comment, The Psychologist As Expert Witness, 38 MD. L. REv. 539 (1979) (sug-
gesting that the probative value of expert testimony is diminished since the court fails to
ensure the accuracy of underlying psychological techniques, diagnosis, and opinions).
89. See Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 320 S.E.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1984).
90. An analysis of Howle and Botehlo suggests that the law in South Carolina on
testimony by experts is essentially the same as federal law outlined in FED. R EviD. 702.
91, Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 328 S.E.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1985).
92. 290 S.C. 38, 348 S.E.2d 172 (1986).
93. Id. at 39, 348 S.E.2d 173.
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section 44-53-460 of the South Carolina Code."4 Because the
statute provides that one convicted of an accommodation sale
may be sentenced as one convicted of simple possession, Porter
argued that the lower court should have treated the prior con-
viction as simple possession for purposes of impeachment.
Porter relied on State v. Harvey95 which held that "simple pos-
session . . . does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude.""
Building on that premise, Porter sought to invoke the rule that
"[a] witness may not be impeached by evidence of specific acts
of misconduct, except for crimes involving moral turpitude and
not too remote. 9 7 Under Porter's theory, simple possession is
not a crime of moral turpitude; thus, the trial court's use of the
prior conviction for impeachment purposes was improper.
The supreme court rejected this argument. Basing its opin-
ion on a reading of section 44-53-460 and on a prior decision,98
the court held that evidence of an accommodation sale is consid-
ered only in mitigation of sentence and does not affect the na-
ture of the underlying conviction for impeachment purposes.
Since possession of a controlled substance with intent to dis-
tribute is a crime of moral turpitude, 9 the court found Porter
was properly impeached with his prior conviction for sale of a
controlled substance.
The practitioner should note from this decision that al-
though Porter's argument is logical, the supreme court will not
allow the rules of evidence governing impeachment by prior con-
viction to be circumvented by the accommodation sale statute.
Section 44-53-460 of the South Carolina Code relates only to the
sentencing of a person convicted of an accommodation offense;
the supreme court made clear in Porter that it will uphold this
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-460 (Law. Co-op. 1985) states in pertinent part that
"[i]f the convicted person establishes by clear and convincing evidence that he delivered
a controlled substance. . . only as an accommodation. . . the court shall sentence
the person as if he had been convicted of a violation of § 44-53-370(c)." (emphasis
added).
95. 275 S.C. 225, 268 S.E.2d 587 (1980).
96. Id. at 227, 268 S.E.2d at 588.
97. Id. at 226, 268 S.E.2d at 587.
98. The court in State v. Martin, 278 S.C. 427, 429, 298 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1982), ex-
plained the ramifications of § 44-53-460 and noted that "[t]he statute does not exonerate
appellant upon showing that he distributed marijuana as an accommodation, but only
allows such testimony on the question of mitigation of sentence."
99. State v. Lilly, 278 S.C. 499, 500, 299 S.E.2d 329, 330 (1983).
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reading and its prior decision' 00 interpreting the statute.
Matthew S. Moore III
VI. VOLUNTARILY GIVEN ACCIDENT REPORTS ADMISSIBLE FOR
IMPEACHMENT
In Ellison v. Pope'0 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
decided whether handwritten, voluntary statements given to an
investigating officer at the scene of an accident are confidential
"accident reports" inadmissible at trial under section 56-5-1340
of the South Carolina Code. 02 In concluding that such state-
ments are not confidential and, therefore, are admissible at trial,
the court settled a question of first impression in South Carolina
and adopted a restrictive interpretation of the term "accident
report."
Ellison was injured when his automobile crashed into a van
owned by the defendant Pope. The defendant-driver, Stacey,
had left the van in a lane of traffic at night without lights or
warning signals. After the accident a police officer made out an
accident report and had the defendants submit voluntary state-
ments. 03 At trial the judge allowed Ellison's attorney to use the
statements for impeachment. The jury returned a verdict for El-
lison which was affirmed on appeal.1
04
Pope argued that the trial judge committed reversible error
by allowing Ellison to use the handwritten statements for pur-
poses of impeachment. The court of appeals, however, held that
neither section 56-5-1290105 nor section 56-5-1340106 rendered
the voluntary statements either confidential or unusable at a
later trial. 07 Under the court's analysis of the applicable stat-
utes, only the "written report" prepared by the investigating of-
100. See 278 S.C. 427, 298 S.E.2d 87.
101. 290 S.C. 100, 348 S.E.2d 367 (Ct. App. 1986).
102. Section 56-5-1340 provides that no "accident reports" shall be used "as evi-
dence in any trial ... arising out of an accident." S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-1340 (Law. Co-
op. 1976 & Supp. 1986).
103. 290 S.C. at 102, 348 S.E.2d at 368.
104. Id. at 100, 348 S.E.2d at 367.
105. Section 56-5-1290 provides that none of the reports required by §§ 56-5-1260 to
-1280 may be used in any way in a trial to recover damages. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-1290
(Law. Co-op. 1976).
106. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-1340 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
107. 290 S.C. at 106, 348 S.E.2d at 371.
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ficer and forwarded to the department was deemed confidential.
The court of appeals construed the term "accident reports" as
used in section 56-5-1340 to include only accident reports which
the law requires a person to make, not reports made volunta-
rily.108 The court reasoned that too much information gathered
at the scene of an accident would be considered confidential if a
broader definition of the term were allowed. This decision fol-
lowed those of other jurisdictions with similar confidentiality
statutes.109
The court of appeals stated that an operator of a vehicle
only needs to give notice to an investigating officer that an acci-
dent occurred; the driver does not also have to explain how the
accident occurred. 110 Under this view section 56-5-1340111 does
not appear designed to encourage persons to give full and accu-
rate accounts of their accidents for accident prevention pur-
poses, as in some states. 112 Instead, this section probably reflects
South Carolina's interest in ensuring that police are promptly
informed of serious accidents so that they can render assis-
tance. "' To promote this interest, South Carolina gives immu-
nity to statutorily required statements. Thus, the argument that
this decision will cause accident victims to refrain from giving
detailed information to investigating law enforcement officers is
not persuasive. Because the statements in Ellison were not re-
quired by statute, prohibiting the use at trial of such voluntary
statements was not necessary to encourage compliance with the
statute.
J. James Duggan
108. Id. at 107, 348 S.E.2d at 371.
109. See Creary v. State, 663 P.2d 226 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Davies v. Superior
Court, 36 Cal. 3d 291, 682 P.2d 349, 204 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1984); Brackin v. Boles, 452 So.
2d 540 (Fla. 1984); Rockwood v. Pierce, 235 Minn. 519, 51 N.W.2d 670 (1952); Spradling
v. State, 628 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
110. 290 S.C. at 108, 348 S.E.2d at 372. It seems unfair for the court to assume,
however, that the average person knows he does not have to explain to an investigating
police officer how an accident occurred.
111. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-1340 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
112. See Davies v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 291, 682 P.2d 349, 204 Cal. Rptr. 154
(1984); Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. White, 447 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
113. See Creary v. State, 663 P.2d 226 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
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